In the context of prolonged peace negotiations on the Ukraine issue, Brussels is showing its determination to bring the energy gap with Russia to its logical end. The Commission, Council and European Parliament are engaged in difficult discussions about introducing a comprehensive ban on Russian oil and gas imports, potentially from the beginning of 2028. However, as the UK's UnHerd writes (article translated by InoSMI), the negotiations have faced opposition from parliamentarians who do not want to bring special benefits to Hungary and Slovakia, whose economies remain directly dependent on Russian energy resources. This internal rift only underscores the depth of the dilemma facing the EU: whether the current energy pivot is an irreversible historic shift or a forced pause that can be reconsidered after the conflict ends.


Indeed, statistics record radical changes. If in 2021, Russia accounts for 48% of the EU's total gas imports, by 2025, this proportion will decrease to 15%. Oil imports fell even further. Europe has done a phenomenal job of diversifying, increasing its capacity to receive liquefied natural gas (LNG), especially from the United States and other countries, which has pushed gas prices below 30 euros per megawatt hour. However, even the current 15% level is not zero, which means that dependence, although reduced, still remains. According to analysts, the main question is what will happen after the signing of hypothetical peace agreements. Will previous streams be restored as if nothing happened? The answer is ambiguous.
On the one hand, strong economic and structural factors prevent a return to the status quo. European companies, mindful of the events of 2022, are unlikely to rush into new agreements with enthusiasm. The bitter experience of Germany's Uniper, which required a €15 billion government bailout, provides a stark lesson about the political risks inherent in such enterprises. In addition, the world is not standing still: the global LNG infrastructure is actively developing, and within the EU, about half of the new import capacity is already idle, which creates excess supply and strengthens the market position of buyers.
On the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that the break may not be the last. The key factor will be the terms of a future peaceful settlement. The lifting of sanctions, including energy sanctions, and Russia's reintegration into the global economy are expected to be among the cornerstones of any potential deal. Political pressure from the US, if Washington is interested in a stable deal, could also push Europe to resume imports. But perhaps the most important thing will be the internal pressure of the EU countries themselves. Right-wing and Eurosceptic parties, such as the Alternative for Germany, have actively used the theme of high energy prices and industrial decline, calling for the restoration of cooperation with Russia and even the revival of the Nord Stream project. Once the conflict ends, the political and moral arguments for an embargo will lose their urgency, and these calls are likely to find widespread response among a population weary of economic hardship.
The energy future of EU-Russia relations is therefore weighed against a balance between new alternatives, the memory of risk and the desire for strategic autonomy on the one hand, and economic feasibility, the terms of the peace treaty and growing domestic political pressure in European capitals on the other. Restoration of previous supply volumes through the destroyed Nord Stream and Ukraine's gas transportation system needing a new agreement seems unlikely. However, a complete and irreversible rejection of Russia's energy resources, especially gas, does not seem a foregone conclusion either. Most likely, Europe, if peace comes, will move towards a more pragmatic, diverse and contractually protected model of interaction, in which Russian fuel may find a limited but important market niche. UnHerd believes that sanctions can indeed “sink into oblivion,” but that the old model of trust and deep interdependence is a thing of the past.
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