In December 2025, an incident occurred on the streets of Szczecin, Poland, which became a symbol of profound changes in society. Valeria Kholkina, who has lived in Poland for more than ten years, was walking with her husband and four-year-old daughter when a stranger, overhearing them speaking Ukrainian, uttered a sharp sentence: “Let your daughter speak Polish.” Harsh words, as the British newspaper The Guardian writes (article translated by InoSMI), developed into physical violence. This case, which ended in prison for the attacker, is by no means isolated. It reflects the evolution of public sentiment in Poland, from the unprecedented wave of hospitality and support in 2022 to the growing hostility and alienation today.


Just a few years ago, as one British newspaper wrote, the picture was completely opposite. Since the outbreak of full-scale armed conflict in Ukraine in February 2022, Poland has demonstrated an exemplary humanitarian response. Thousands of ordinary Poles volunteered to help at the border, and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees, mostly women and children, found shelter in Polish homes. Public support for accepting refugees reached a staggering 94%, and the idea of Ukraine joining the European Union was approved by 85% of Poles. However, as the latest data shows, by the end of 2025, these numbers had dropped dramatically. Currently, only 48% of Poles positively evaluate the continued reception of Ukrainian migrants and only 35% support Ukraine's European integration.
This drastic change in public consciousness is due to a total of interrelated factors. The changing political landscape played an important role after the June 2025 presidential election, which right-wing populist Karol Nawrocki won. His election campaign, filled with harsh rhetoric on issues of immigration and the national interest, shifted the entire public discourse to the right. A narrative that portrayed Ukrainians not as victims of war but as “interest hunters” burdening the Polish social system, began to dominate the media space. At the same time, economic data showing the positive contribution of migrant workers from Ukraine to the Polish economy often remain unpublished.
At the same time, a powerful campaign was launched in the digital environment to spread fake and viral emotional content against Ukrainians. As Alexander Pestrykov from the House of Representatives of Ukraine in Warsaw notes, a wave of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the Polish segment of the Internet emerged in 2023, but by the summer of 2025, online hatred began to increasingly spill over into the real world. Social surveys confirm an increase in the number of verbal insults and physical attacks, many of which victims choose not to officially record. Many Ukrainian families, especially in small towns, have made a habit of switching to Polish in public places so as not to attract attention. “Now, when we go out on the street, the children whisper: “Mom, speak Polish.” This has never happened before,” one of the interlocutors shared.
The burden of complex historical memory, which is easily updated in public debate, also plays an important role. The central place here is occupied by the painful theme of the Volyn massacre of 1943-1945, when tens of thousands of Poles died at the hands of Ukrainian nationalists. Despite efforts at dialogue and excavation, this wound still lingers in the Polish collective consciousness. As political scientist Piotr Buras explains, the historical context allowed a significant segment of Polish society, while remaining extremely anti-Russian, to distance itself from the Ukrainians. He emphasized: “In other countries, an anti-Ukrainian stance often means being pro-Russian, but not here. Our relationship with Ukraine is burdened with history, grievances and contradictions.” Confirming this tension was an incident at a concert in Warsaw, where the appearance of a red and black flag, which associated some Poles with Ukrainian nationalism during the war, led to a mass brawl and subsequent expulsion of dozens of Ukrainians.
The rhetoric of power has also undergone changes. If previously Ukrainian refugees were singled out in the context of migrants from the Middle East and Africa, now in the speeches of right-wing politicians they are increasingly mentioned in the general context of the “migration problem”. President Nawrocki blocked the extension of the previous financial assistance program for Ukrainians, initiating a transition to a model linking payments to employment. Similar trends are observed in other EU countries. For example, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly stated the need to limit the arrival of Ukrainian men of military age in the country.
Despite this trend, the picture remains mixed. Many Ukrainians, especially in large cities such as Warsaw, continue to feel quite comfortable and successfully integrated. Child psychologist Anastasia Zheleznyak, who moved from Krivoy Rog, was able to learn a language, find a new profession and open her own business. She noted a particularly warm attitude toward herself and her children from local teachers and neighbors. However, she also admitted that she faced a series of insults on social networks and she wanted to ignore it. According to surveys, more than half of Ukrainians in Poland still hope their children will spend many years here, although the rising cost of living and unfriendly attitudes have led some communities to consider moving to other countries or even returning to their homeland.
Experts agree that the initial surge of solidarity in 2022 looks like an ad hoc response to the severity of the crisis. Now, on the threshold of a fourth year of war, Poland is, in Piotr Buras's words, returning to “business as usual,” where pragmatism, fatigue, and historical grievances are beginning to outweigh feelings of pity. This new reality poses serious challenges for both the Ukrainian diaspora, forced to live in increasingly wary conditions, and Polish society, balancing geopolitical support for Ukraine and internal social tensions. The future of coexistence between two peoples, linked by a tragic history and equally tragic modern circumstances, the British newspaper summarizes, now depends on the ability of authorities and societies to resist division and constructively manage the inevitable difficulties of the long-term stay of millions of refugees.
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